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Contextualising the potential risks to the legitimacy of the security and intelligence organisations
In part one of this opinion piece, I laid a foundation on which I now develop the rest of my thoughts. At its core, and ultimately, the National Security (Secretariat/Ministry), and the various security organisations and intelligence agencies wield the power they have in order to serve and protect the people of Ghana. Therefore, to perform their duties effectively, these organisations and agencies need to redress the issue of legitimacy (i.e. trust and confidence). Without a minimum level of cooperation from the citizens (which partly stems from how legitimate citizens see these organisations), these organisations run the risk of being less effective. Various episodes of Afrobarometer and a recent study by UNODC on Ghana indicate the lack of trust and confidence in certain state institutions. This brings me back to the heart of this piece: the recent actions by operatives of the National Security Council Secretariat and the BNI wearing Kaakaamotobi.
The demographics of Ghana and Africa, in combination with the relatively easy and wide availability of social media, have revolutionised the context within which the security sector operates. The conjoined strength of the youth and social media is colossal and has barely left any aspect of humankind untouched. The youth across Africa are not like the previous generation, who dreaded certain state institutions and largely did what the government told them. In the face of shrinking civic and political space in which to articulate their views and request accountable governance, the youth across Africa, as elsewhere, are taking to social media to mobilise and take on the state in largely unprecedented ways. The lessons from the Arab Spring, despite the reversal of certain gains, and the Stop the SARS movement in Nigeria attest to this new security environment and the need for reform. These developments make the issue of the legitimacy of security and intelligence organisations an even more urgent priority.
Moreover, demonstrations or public order events will become even more common and massive, testing the ability of the security and intelligence agencies to deal with such occurrences. Wearing Kaakaamotobi in the face of heated debates and demands by the youth about good governance will not be helpful. We need to check this proliferation of the wearing of Kaakaamotobi when we are already dealing with these levels of mistrust (i.e. legitimacy deficit).
Legitimacy of power holders is crucial for peaceful elections. As we know, elections are now a main means of assuming the reins of power in West Africa, despite the recent return of military coups in the region. Security and intelligence agencies are critical players in elections, and their legitimacy (or lack thereof) affects whether elections are peaceful or violent. This is generally the case in Ghana. In the run-up to the last general election in Ghana, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) had vehemently opposed the wearing of face masks by police (and other security) officers during the electoral season. This was due to a fear that civilians would don security uniforms to intimidate their voters and ultimately threaten the chances of winning the general elections. The concerns of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) were real and grounded in their experience of the electoral violence that occurred in Ayawaso West Wuogon – where, for instance, a vehicle branded in police colours was not owned by the police. The issue of electoral mistrust between the two main political parties, viz, the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), is well-known. This enduring suspicion between NDC and NPP—that the one in power could use the security and intelligence agencies to assist in rigging general elections—makes the need to consistently endeavour to improve the legitimacy of the security and intelligence agencies even more urgent. So, how can we improve legitimacy?
(c) How can we progressively address the issue of the legitimacy of the security and intelligence institutions?
If the players within the security sector suffer from various forms of legitimacy deficit (legitimacy kwashiorkor), it is important that, together, we seek an effective remedy—or at the very least, avoid any worsening of the legitimacy deficit. One way to do this is to prepare, nurture and deepen the interest of the civil sector of society and the media regarding matters of security sector governance. This is a key way to strengthen the oversight and accountability of the sector as well, and in turn, to enhance their legitimacy.
Young people are an asset that can be used to enhance intelligence and security in diverse ways across Africa through improving the legitimacy of these organisations. Creating a conducive space for continuous, meaningful dialogue between the power holders and the audience that seeks to leverage the innovative and curious strength of the youth, in combination with their access to social media, is a great asset for Ghana (and indeed Africa). These are waiting to be fully explored. The old institutional logic/culture of Kaakaamotobi (projecting fear) will not help to enhance the legitimacy of the security and intelligence organisations or bolster their efficiency and effectiveness. Even if these institutions wish to retain the use of Kaakaamotobi, in certain very limited circumstances (e.g. in the arrest of terrorists, members of highly dangerous organised criminal networks, etc.), it must be subject to a more rigorous form of accountability and oversight.
Regarding citizens—who are mostly youths—they should educate themselves more about issues of defence and security, including, for instance: (a) security and defence spending and how it is done accountably and responsibly, (b) gain deep knowledge of tools like the Defence Integrity Index and the Security Sector Public Expenditure Review, (c) study the National Security Strategies and see how they are evolving, (d) learn about best practices of oversight, (e) familiarise themselves with the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 1030, LI 2484, the National Signals Bureau, Act 1040, and other related materials, published works, and laws. For example, concerning Act 1030, the specific aspects of complaints are insightful as part of the accountability mechanisms of the state. As part of reforming and reshaping the governance of security and intelligence agencies, the youth should cultivate an interest in security governance and equip themselves with an in-depth historical knowledge of how these agencies have evolved in Ghana and elsewhere. They must begin to demand more accountable security and intelligence agencies by asserting themselves as key players within the security and intelligence governance space. If the youth are waiting to be invited, no one will invite them. Youth Parliaments in Africa, working with the media, can take up some of these issues on various platforms and give them African relevance and a priority agenda driven by the youth. The youth should leverage their numbers and social media to drive the reform of the security sector in Ghana and beyond. I am still shocked that the case law Banful and Others v. AG (the GITMO 2 case) has not been widely read and evaluated by those in this field. That case law, in my view, redefined the boundaries between national security, transparency, and accountability in a relatively straightforward manner. The bench/judiciary is key in providing oversight and accountability, as are other actors such as Parliament and the media. They each have a role to play in strengthening the legitimacy of these organisations.
The governance of the security sector in general is enhanced by a healthy relationship between the power holders (officials) and the audience (citizens). As indicated, legitimacy is an ongoing dialogue between the citizens (the audience) and the security and intelligence institutions and securocrats (power holders). In my view, therefore, wearing Kaakaamotobi within the context of mistrust is no way to enhance legitimacy. On the contrary, wearing Kaakaamotobi reinforces the stereotype that such agencies are masking something unfriendly, with ulterior motives. For the BNI, National Security Council Secretariat, Ghana Armed Forces, the police, and so on, it is important for them to continually bear in mind the essential role of legitimacy in accomplishing their goals. In a liberal democracy, legitimacy is crucially important within both the criminal justice system and the broader scheme of democratic governance.
Conclusion
Let me conclude with this. I do not intend to batter the BNI, National Security Council Secretariat, GAF and so on, per se. On the contrary, I seek to draw attention to how we can all work together to strengthen security sector governance and reform, and ultimately, the democracy of Ghana—and indeed the whole of Africa. Like Johnny Kwadjo, there are individuals within these organisations who have views very similar to mine. They should publish their experiences upon retirement, as their positionality as insiders often brings revelations that enrich the debate on Security Sector Governance/Reform. Already, some police officers (including retired IGPs) are beginning to publish their experiences and reflections, which is laudable. People should read them.
Let me now exit on something that is also bothering me. Why is it that the National Security Council (Ministry/Secretariat) is wading further and further into all sorts of operations (including providing water, constructing roads, demolishing structures, arresting foreigners, etc.) and so duplicating the roles of several already established security, intelligence and other state institutions? In addition, why has there been a proliferation of operations outlets all over the place, including one at the presidency? This feature is not unique to any political party, but they see it differently depending on whether they are in power or in opposition.
We should be very careful as a nation to avoid gradually creating a beast (proliferation of operational units) that we cannot domesticate and hold accountable to the highest extent of the law (and democratic ethos).
As the Ewe ethnic group in Ghana has a proverb that rightly encapsulates my concern and caution: Dzapata be deviwo menya ku o, which implies that one should not play with fire.
At its most basic level, the Ghanaian security sector in the age of democratisation still grapples with finding the right balance between legitimacy and coercion. Civil Society Organisations, (social) media influencers, youth organisations, academics, traditional leaders, and others should strive to keep issues of Security Sector Governance and Reform at the forefront of national priorities. After all, one way to translate any National Security Strategy into effective and efficient realisation is through robust oversight. I yearn for rigorous debates in Parliament around security sector governance – something in the calibre demonstrated by people like Modesto Kwasi Akpaloo under the First Republic, and J.H. Mensah, Ben Kunbuor, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, James Agalga, etc., in the Fourth Republic. Interestingly, and based on Hansards, they all (as Members of Parliament) mostly displayed outstanding prowess in matters of security oversight only when they were in opposition. Truly, as the Twi proverb says, afidie yi aboa ne su nko na se egyae no nso a n’esu nko, which means when an animal is caught in a trap, its cry is different from when it has been freed from a trap.
At the very least, let us all remember the counsel by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) that legitimacy is a product of dialogue between the power holder and the audience, where the power holder makes a claim to authority and the audience responds to this claim. This view has wide relevance because legitimacy is key in enhancing trust and confidence in our criminal justice system, security sector governance (and reform), and ultimately, our democracy.
I invite others, including young people, women, men, academics, media practitioners, the members of the judiciary, securocrats, and other actors within the security sector, to further engage with this issue of oversight. Don’t stand and stare.
Written by Emmanuel Sowatey (PhD, Cantab, from the Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge)
Email: eas96@cam.ac.uk / emmanuel.sowatey@gmail.com
NB: You may read Part I of this article below.
National Security Operatives, Bureau of National Investigations and Kaakaamotobi: Is the legitimacy of certain security and intelligence institutions under further threat? (Part I)
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DISCLAIMER: The Views, Comments, Opinions, Contributions and Statements made by Readers and Contributors on this platform do not necessarily represent the views or policy of Multimedia Group Limited.
